Had one with an IPD overhaul kit wrist pin bushing failed on a piston with 25000 miles. Interstate McGee is the only aftermarket that I trust.
I have never heard of them but once I did a small amount of research I have noticed that they have been around for 70 years but I cant find any reviews on them. Mahle pretty much makes everyone's pistons with just a different name stamped on it from what I've heard.
Inspection Lab fairly well-equipped. If you have any sort of physical challenge, forget it, if you know the job or not or even trying to get along they will find a way to get rid of you.
Gain opportunities to drive Forklift, Reach truck, and order puller At the end of the day, after all is said and done, the feeling of not being appreciated was always prevalent.
Inexperienced Engineering Dept, Miscommunication, mixed bag of tools (some advanced machinery, some outdated), broken machinery not being fixed in a timely matter makes getting job done difficult, Poor software systems, lack of leadership. Nice coworkers, great customers.
Too much office politics coming into play lately. ISO 9001:2015 with Design Standard specifies requirements for a quality management system where an organization needs to demonstrate its ability to consistently provide product that meets customer and applicable statutory and regulatory requirements, and aims to enhance customer satisfaction through the effective application of the system, including processes for continual improvement of the system and the assurance of conformity to customer and applicable statutory and regulatory requirements.
Engine bearings and bushings AfghanistanAlbaniaAlgeriaAmerican SamoaAndorraAngolaAnguillaAntigua & BarbudaArgentinaArmeniaArubaAustraliaAustriaAzerbaijanBahamasBahrainBangladeshBarbadosBelarusBelgiumBelizeBeninBermudaBhutanBoliviaBonaireBosnia & HerzegovinaBotswanaBrazilBritish Virgin IslandsBruneiBulgariaBurkina FasoBurundiCambodiaCameroonCanadaCanary Landscape Verde Cayman Islands Central African RepublicChadChileChinaColombiaComorosCongoCongo, DRC Cook IslandsCosta RicaCroatiaCuracaoCyprusCzech RepublicDenmarkDjiboutiDominicaDominican Republic East TimorEcuadorEgyptEl SalvadorEquatorial GuineaEritreaEstoniaEthiopiaFalkland IslandsFaroe IslandsFijiFinlandFranceFrench GuianaGabonGambiaGeorgiaGermanyGhanaGibraltarGreeceGreenlandGrenadaGuadeloupeGuamGuatemalaGuernseyGuinea Bissau Guinea RepublicGuyanaHaitiHondurasHong KongHungaryIcelandIndiaIndonesiaIraqIrelandIsraelItalyIvory CoastJamaicaJapanJerseyJordanKazakhstanKenyaKiribatiKosovoKuwaitKyrgyzstanLaosLatviaLebanonLesothoLiberiaLiechtensteinLithuaniaLuxembourgMacauMacedoniaMadagascarMalawiMalaysiaMaldivesMaliMaltaMarshall IslandsMartiniqueMauritaniaMauritiusMayotteMexicoMicronesiaMoldovaMonacoMongoliaMontenegroMontserratMoroccoMozambiqueNamibiaNauruNepalNetherlandsNevisNew Caledonian ZealandNicaraguaNigerNigeriaNiueNorthern Mariana IslandsNorwayOmanPakistanPalauPanamaPapua New GuineaParaguayPeruPhilippinesPolandPortugalPuerto RicoQatarReunion IslandRomaniaRussiaRwandaSabaSamoaSao Tome Saudi ArabiaSenegalSerbiaSeychellesSierra LeoneSingaporeSlovakiaSloveniaSolomon IslandsSomaliaSomaliland Rep South Africa South Korea South SudanSpainSri Lankest Vincent St.
MaartenSurinameSwazilandSwedenSwitzerlandTahiti & French PolynesiaTaiwanTajikistanTanzaniaThailandTogoTongaTrinidad & TobagoTunisiaTurkeyTurks & CaicosTuvaluUgandaUkraineUnited Arab EmiratesUnited KingdomUnited StatesUruguayUS Virgin IslandsUzbekistanVanuatuVenezuelaVietnamYemenZambiaZimbabwe Not long ago, Josh found his Mazda RX-8 in an restartable condition after about a month of garaging.
Firestone and Midas won’t replace.” Within minutes, a user known as @interstatebatts, which turned out to be the official voice of Interstate’s customer service division, told him that his battery should absolutely be replaced, and that Josh should contact Interstate more directly to remedy the situation. In the classical model of economics, a self-interested consumer like Josh would readily accept Interstate’s offer, seeing no downside.
So in the end, Josh refused the offer, and bought a brand-new non- Interstate battery at a chain auto parts store, which will honor his receipt at dozens of locations around the Bay Area. And he swears never to buy an Interstate battery again, because even the best-intentioned customer service and warranty offers mean squat if they cause the consumer more hassle than the product is worth.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
In the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, Congress made it a federal offense “for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.” The Act neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce.
We hold that the Act exceeds the authority of Congress “o regulate Commerce. On March 10, 1992, respondent, who was then a 12th grade student, arrived at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas, carrying a concealed .38 caliber handguns and five bullets.
Acting upon an anonymous tip, school authorities confronted respondent, who admitted that he was carrying the weapon. He was arrested and charged under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises.
The District Court denied the motion, concluding that §922(q) “is a constitutional exercise of Congress' well-defined power to regulate activities in and affecting commerce, and the `business' of elementary, middle and high schools. The District Court conducted a bench trial, found him guilty of violating §922(q), and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release.
“Comprehensive as the word `among' is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one. Under this line of precedent, the Court held that certain categories of activity such as “production,” “manufacturing,” and “mining” were within the province of state governments, and thus were beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause.
See Pickard v. Wilburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942) (describing development of Commerce Clause jurisprudence). These laws ushered in a new era of federal regulation under the commerce power.
The justification for this formal distinction was rooted in the fear that otherwise “there would be virtually no limit to the federal power and for all practical purposes we should have a completely centralized government.” Two years later, in the watershed case of NLRB v. Jones & Loughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), the Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act against a Commerce Clause challenge, and in the process, departed from the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” effects on interstate commerce.
“even if appealed's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as `direct' or `indirect.' Jones & Loughlin Steel, Darby, and Pickard ushered in an era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that greatly expanded the previously defined authority of Congress under that Clause.
301 U. S., at 37; see also Darby, supra, at 119-120 (Congress may regulate intrastate activity that has a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce); Pickard, supra, at 125 (Congress may regulate activity that “exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce”). Since that time, the Court has heeded that warning and undertaken to decide whether a rational basis existed for concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce.
In response to the dissent's warnings that the Court was powerless to enforce the limitations on Congress' commerce powers because “ll activities affecting commerce, even in the minutest degree, , may be regulated and controlled by Congress,” 392 U. S., at 204 (Douglas, J., dissenting), the With Court replied that the dissent had misread precedent as “either here nor in Pickard has the Court declared that Congress may use a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad general regulation of state or private activities,” id. Consistent with this structure, we have identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power.
See, e.g., Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911) (upholding amendments to Safety Appliance Act as applied to vehicles used in intrastate commerce); Perez, supra, at 150 (“or example, the destruction of an aircraft (18 U.S.C. Within this final category, admittedly, our case law has not been clear whether an activity must “affect” or “substantially affect” interstate commerce in order to be within Congress' power to regulate it under the Commerce Clause.
Compare Present v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990), with With, supra, at 196, n. 27 (the Court has never declared that “Congress may use a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad general regulation of state or private activities”). We conclude, consistent with the great weight of our case law, that the proper test requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity “substantially affects” interstate commerce.
We now turn to consider the power of Congress, in the light of this framework, to enact §922(q). Thus, if §922(q) is to be sustained, it must be under the third category as a regulation of an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.
Roscoe Wilburn operated a small farm in Ohio, on which, in the year involved, he raised 23 acres of wheat. It was his practice to sow winter wheat in the fall, and after harvesting it in July to sell a portion of the crop, to feed part of it to poultry and livestock on the farm, to use some in making flour for home consumption, and to keep the remainder for seeding future crops.
It can hardly be denied that a factor of such volume and variability as home consumed wheat would have a substantial influence on price and market conditions. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.
The Court interpreted the possession component of §1202(a) to require an additional nexus to interstate commerce both because the statute was ambiguous and because “unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal state balance.” The Court thus interpreted the statute to reserve the constitutional question whether Congress could regulate, without more, the “mere possession” of firearms.
, at 339, n. 4; see also United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 448 (1953) (plurality opinion) (“The principle is old and deeply embedded in our jurisprudence that this Court will construe a statute in a manner that requires decision of serious constitutional questions only if the statutory language leaves no reasonable alternative”). Unlike the statute in Bass, §922(q) has no express jurisdictional element which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce.
Although as part of our independent evaluation of constitutionality under the Commerce Clause we of course consider legislative findings, and indeed even congressional committee findings, regarding effect on interstate commerce, see, e.g., Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990), the Government concedes that “either the statute nor its legislative history contain express congressional findings regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of gun possession in a school zone.” We agree with the Government that Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce.
See McClung, 379 U. S., at 304; see also Perez, 402 U. S., at 156 (“Congress need make particularized findings in order to legislate”). But to the extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here.
The Government argues that Congress has accumulated institutional expertise regarding the regulation of firearms through previous enactments. We agree, however, with the Fifth Circuit that importation of previous findings to justify §922(q) is especially inappropriate here because the “prior federal enactments or Congressional findings speak to the subject of section 922(q) or its relationship to interstate commerce.
Indeed, section 922(q) plows thoroughly new ground and represents a sharp break with the long-standing pattern of federal firearms' legislation.” The Government's essential contention, in fine, is that we may determine here that §922(q) is valid because possession of a firearm in a local school zone does indeed substantially affect interstate commerce.
The Government argues that possession of a firearm in a school zone may result in violent crime and that violent crime can be expected to affect the functioning of the national economy in two ways. Second, violent crime reduces the willingness of individuals to travel to areas within the country that are perceived to be unsafe.
The Government also argues that the presence of guns in schools poses a substantial threat to the educational process by threatening the learning environment. A handicapped educational process, in turn, will result in a less productive citizenry.
As a result, the Government argues that Congress could rationally have concluded that §922(q) substantially affects interstate commerce. Similarly, under the Government's “national productivity” reasoning, Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens: family law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody), for example.
Under the theories that the Government presents in support of §922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign. Thus, if we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard-pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.
Although Justice Breyer argues that acceptance of the Government's rationales would not authorize a general federal police power, he is unable to identify any activity that the States may regulate, but Congress may not. Justice Breyer posits that there might be some limitations on Congress' commerce power such as family law or certain aspects of education.
These suggested limitations, when viewed in light of the dissent's expansive analysis, are devoid of substance. Specifically, the dissent reasons that (1) gun related violence is a serious problem; (2) that problem, in turn, has an adverse effect on classroom learning; and (3) that adverse effect on classroom learning, in turn, represents a substantial threat to trade and commerce.
This analysis would be equally applicable, if not more so, to subjects such as family law and direct regulation of education. Congress could determine that a school's curriculum has a-significant” effect on the extent of classroom learning.
As a result, Congress could mandate a federal curriculum for local elementary and secondary schools because what is taught in local schools has a significant “effect on classroom learning,” cf. Justice Breyer rejects our reading of precedent and argues that “Congress.
Could rationally conclude that schools fall on the commercial side of the line.” Again, Justice Breyer's rationale lacks any real limits because, depending on the level of generality, any activity can be looked upon as commercial.
Under the dissent's rationale, Congress could just as easily look at child rearing as “fall on the commercial side of the line” because it provides a “valuable service--namely, to equip with the skills they need to survive in life and, more specifically, in the workplace.” Admittedly, a determination whether an intrastate activity is commercial or noncommercial may in some cases result in legal uncertainty.
But, s o long as Congress' authority is limited to those powers enumerated in the Constitution, and so long as those enumerated powers are interpreted as having judicially enforceable outer limits, congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause will always engender “legal uncertainty.” As Chief Justice Marshall stated in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.
To the same effect is the concurring opinion of Justice Cardozo in Shelter Poultry: “There is a view of causation that would obliterate the distinction of what is national and what is local in the activities of commerce.
The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce. Respondent was a local student at a local school; there is no indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce, and there is no requirement that his possession of the firearm have any concrete tie to interstate commerce.
To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States. Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps down that road, giving great deference to congressional action.
The broad language in these opinions has suggested the possibility of additional expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further. Gibbons v. Ogden, supra, at 195, and that there never will be a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local, cf.